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Young People and the Great Recession 
 
This article reviews the effects of the Great Recession on youth labour markets. We argue 
that young people aged 16-24 have suffered disproportionately during the recession. Using 
the USA and UK as case studies, we analyse youth unemployment using microdata. We 
argue that there is convincing evidence that the effects of unemployment when young impose 
costs on individuals and society well into the future. Though the effects of current policies on 
youth unemployment are uncertain, there is still a strong case for policy intervention to 
address the difficulties that the young are having in accessing employment. 
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Youth joblessness has been a problem in many countries for several decades. It has 
been the subject of a wide range of policy interventions. Yet the accumulated wealth 
of policy experience failed to prevent a rapid rise in youth unemployment during the 
so-called “Great Recession” which occurred in 2008-09. This raises serious questions 
about the relevance of past policy lessons to the present predicament of the youth 
labour market.  Should we discount these past lessons, and what can we learn about 
future policy from recent experience? These issues are the subject of this paper. We 
also discuss the longer-term implications of youth unemployment and its effects on 
the well-being of the young, arguing that our findings reinforce the need to explore 
policy options that address youth unemployment.  
We begin by setting the background context of longer-run trends in youth 
unemployment. Using evidence across a range of developed countries, we then 
describe the dynamics of youth unemployment during the Great Recession; next, we 
look at some micro-econometric evidence on the effects of unemployment from the 
UK and the USA; finally we take a controversial line on policy, arguing that the 
conventional wisdom on youth employment policy has turned out to be largely 
irrelevant during this recession.  The solution to the youth unemployment problem is 
simply put – more jobs for young people. 
 
1. Policy Background 
Those aged over the minimum school leaving age and less than 25 are generally 
described as “youth”. In 1999, this classification was formalized by the International 
Labour Office (ILO 2011) in its definitions of the “Key Indicators of the Labour 
Market” (KILM). One of these, KILM 9, is described as “youth unemployment”. It 
comprises the number of unemployed that are aged less than 25. The ILO treats those 
aged 25 and over as “adults”, largely because, by that age, most have completed 
education and have entered the labour force. The lower end of the range, the 
minimum school-leaving age, varies by country (and by state in the USA). For most 
OECD countries it lies between 16 and 18. The “youth” age range captures almost all 
individuals’ initial, and potentially formative, experience of the labour market. 
However, there are still significant contrasts within this age group. Individuals who 
leave education at the minimum school leaving age are likely to have considerably 
more work experience by the age of 25 relative to those who spend their late teens and 
early twenties in full-time education. 
 
Changes in educational participation influence the size of the youth labour market, 
and therefore youth unemployment rates. Thus, voluntary or mandatory increases in 
educational participation could potentially increase the youth unemployment rate 
without any increase in the number of young people seeking work. On the other hand, 
increased educational participation might have no effect on the youth unemployment 
rate. This is because many students, particularly part-timers, actively participate in the 
labour market. In addition, the youth unemployment rate does not include those young 
people who neither participate in the labour market, nor in education. The so-called 
NEETs (young people not in education, employment or training) are drawn from both 
unemployed and inactive youth.  
 
The worsening labour market performance of youth became apparent in the 1970s. 
Freeman (1979), Welch (1979) and Berger (1984) argued that its genesis lay with the 
substantial increase in supply associated with the entry of the baby boomers into the   2
labour market in the 1970s. But instead of improving as cohort size declined, the 
relative labour market performance of young people worsened during the 1980s and 
1990s. Higher unemployment was accompanied by an increase in the wage gap 
between adults and youths, particularly during the 1980s and early 1990s. There was 
some recovery in the late 1990s and the early part of this century, but not to the levels 
of the early 1970s.  As we shall see, there has been a further deterioration of the youth 
labour market since the beginning of the Great Recession. 
 
There are a number of reasons why youth unemployment rates may be higher than 
adult rates.  In the internal labour market, youths will generally have less specific 
human capital relevant to the particular firm for whom they work and also less general 
work skills.  Even without a formal last-in first-out (LIFO) policy, firms may take the 
view that the future benefit of further investment in young workers is outweighed by 
its current costs.  Further, liquidity concerns may cause firms to seek layoffs among 
younger workers first, particularly where statutory redundancy payments are seniority 
weighted, as is the case in most countries. 
 
In the external labour market, young workers may be less efficient in job search 
activities than adults.  Younger workers are likely to have fewer contacts and less 
experience of finding work, placing them at a relative disadvantage compared to 
adults.  They may also find themselves in an experience trap, where employers select 
workers with experience, and as a result labour market entrants are never hired and so 
cannot increase their own experience. On the supply side, youths are less likely to 
have significant financial commitments than their elders.  And their parents may be 
willing to support them should they not find work.  Such factors may create an 
incentive to restrict their job search activity, leading to higher rates of unemployment.  
Whether the cause is on the demand or the supply side, the outcome is that youths 
experience considerably higher rates of unemployment than adults. 
 
In response to the substantial increases in youth unemployment during the 1980s and 
early 1990s, there was a significant increase in policy initiatives targeted at 
unemployment in general and youth unemployment in particular. These culminated in 
the OECD Jobs Study (1994), which argued that policies to improve the working of 
the labour market were critical for reducing high levels of youth unemployment. It 
suggested that: 
 
“A progressive shift of resources is needed from passive income support 
to active measures. Active labour market policies improve access to the 
labour market and jobs; develop job-related skills; and promote more 
efficient labour markets.” (OECD Jobs Study 1994) 
 
With OECD encouragement, many member countries introduced a range of active 
labour market policies (ALMPs). These were extensively evaluated to determine their 
labour market effects.  In this context, “evaluation” tends to mean comparisons 
between those “treated” by a particular intervention and a comparable “control” group 
that are not so “treated”. Such evaluations can be described as partial equilibrium in 
the sense that they focus on a narrow range of outcomes (e.g. difference in the 
probability of finding full-time employment between the treated and untreated) in 
distinct sub-populations of the labour force. On the other hand, models that take a   3
broader macroeconomic perspective tend to be insufficiently disaggregated to capture 
the general equilibrium impacts of ALMPs. 
 
Even these partial equilibrium evaluations of ALMP impact have not shown them to 
be an unqualified success. Heckman and Smith (1999a, 1999b) examined the US Job 
Training Partnership Act (JTPA), which provided job-training services for 
economically disadvantaged adults and youth, dislocated workers and those facing 
significant employment barriers. They found that the estimates of the returns to 
training were sensitive to a) the set of training centers included in the evaluation b) 
how outliers in the earnings data are handled c) the construction of the earnings data 
d) control group substitution d) treatment group drop out. Even after these 
adjustments they conclude that their results for youth “fit comfortably into the pattern 
of several decades of research that finds very limited earnings effects for the types of 
services offered by JTPA”. In 1996, when asked by the Economist how much training 
schemes in the US help their clientele Jim Heckman replied that ‘zero is not a bad 
number’ (Economist, 6th April, 1996).  
 
Grubb (1999) is slightly more positive when reviewing US education and training 
programmes for disadvantaged youths. He argues that successful programmes 
embody some combination of the following characteristics:
  
i) close links with the local labour market, targeting jobs with relatively high wages, 
strong employment growth and opportunities for advancement; 
ii) a mix of academic education, occupational skills and on-the-job training; 
iii) opportunities to enter further education, to further develop skills and 
competencies; 
iv) support services, focused on the needs of clients and their families; and 
v) constant redesign of the programme to learn from past experience. 
 
Auspos et al. (1999) conclude that European ALMPs have not produced earnings 
gains for participants, but argue that smaller targeted schemes aimed at disadvantaged 
groups are more effective in raising employment than broad-based training 
programmes, particularly when used in conjunction with job search interventions.
 
Successful programmes tend to be costly and may be difficult to expand broadly. 
Bergemann, and van den Berg (2006) argue that training programmes are more 
effective for women than men in Europe. Focussing on youth, Calmfors et al. (2002) 
summarize the Swedish experience of ALMPs by arguing that youth programmes 
have caused substantial displacement effects but the gains for participants are 
uncertain. 
 
One of the major UK ALMPs is the New Deal for Young People (NDYP). It was 
established in 1998 and was aimed at those aged 18 to 24. All those in this age group 
that have been on Job Seekers Allowance (JSA) for more than six months enter the 
“Gateway” in which they are given extensive advice on how to find employment. 
Participation is compulsory; every eligible individual who refuses to cooperate faces a 
loss of entitlement to benefits. 
 
Blundell et al. (2001) show that the NDYP raises the probability of entering 
employment by around 5 per cent in the short run.  Although these effects are 
relatively small, Van Reenen (2004) calculates that the marginal social benefit of the 
programme exceeds its marginal social cost. Blundell et al (2004) also found that the   4
impact of the program significantly raised transitions to employment by about 5 
percent but argue that this effect may fall in the longer run. These positive effects are 
relatively small. However, this is one of the largest scale ALMPs with more than 2 
million people entering employment via NDYP, during its existence. 
 
Card, Kluve and Weber (2009) carry out a meta-analysis of ALMPs. They examine 
199 programmes drawn from 97 studies over the period 1995 to 2007. The 
programmes themselves are heterogeneous covering classroom and work experience, 
job search assistance, subsidized public and private employment programs. In the 
short run, the number of programs with a significantly positive outcome only exceeds 
those with a significantly negative outcome by a small margin. Over longer time 
horizons, the balance is more in favour of positive outcomes. There are also 
significant differences between countries in the types of programs, which succeed or 
fail. There is no upward trend over time in positive outcomes. The evaluations contain 
little information on costs, making it difficult to establish how affordable large-scale 
expansion of successful programs might be. The Card et al. study supports Grubb and 
Martin’s (OECD 2001) conclusion that, “one of the most disappointing conclusions 
from the evaluation literature is that almost all evaluations show that special measures are 
not effective for disadvantaged youths.”  
 
General conclusions on ALMPS seem to be that: 
•  Evaluations show that successful programmes, which enhance the probability 
of finding employment, tend to target particular groups, devoting substantial 
resources per client and keeping the focus close to the jobs market. 
•  Many evaluation studies show more favourable outcomes for females than for 
males. 
•  Positive ALMP evaluations tended to occur during periods of buoyant labour 
demand. Problems of deadweight loss increase when there is excess supply of 
labour. 
•  The effects of scaling up ALMPs that have positive labour market outcomes 
are uncertain. 
•  ALMPs aimed at younger people are less successful than those which target 
older people. 
•  Little is known about the general equilibrium effects of ALMPs. 
 
2. Youth Labour Markets in the Great Recession 
The focus on ALMPs preceded the so-called “Great Recession”, which was associated 
with the financial collapse of late 2007. Most countries experienced a sharp fall in 
output beginning in early 2008. The demand for labour fell and unemployment 
increased. We show below that youth unemployment increased more rapidly than the 
overall level of unemployment as the recession deepened. We also discuss how many 
countries introduced discretionary policies to combat the increases in unemployment 
specifically associated with the Great Recession. These were in addition to the 
automatic stabilisers which supported income levels as demand fell. 
Table 1 contains estimated youth unemployment rates for OECD countries from 1970 
to 2009.
1 From 1970 to 2004, the data are averaged over five-year periods, with more 
                                                 
1 Data drawn from OECD Statistical Extracts: LFS by sex and age.   5
recent data following in successive columns. Youth unemployment rates have been 
high throughout this period and have generally increased since the beginning of the 
recession. In 2009 youth unemployment rates among larger industrial economies 
included France (22.8%), Italy(25.4%), Spain (37.4%), Sweden (25%), UK (18.9%) 
and USA (17.6%). For the OECD as a whole it increased from 12% to 16.7% over the 
same period, the highest recorded level since 1970. Only in Japan, Korea, and the 
Netherlands were youth unemployment rates in single digits at the beginning of 2010 
and only Germany experienced a reduction in the rate of youth unemployment 
between 2007 and 2009.  
Most OECD member states had high rates of youth unemployment prior to the Great 
Recession. But in Sweden and the USA, youth unemployment in 2009 was at a 
historically high rate. In the UK, it reached levels not experienced since the early 
1980s, while in Canada, France and Italy it rose to levels not encountered during the 
last decade. In most other OECD countries, youth unemployment increased during the 
recession, but only to levels that were typical of the first half of the decade. One 
important exception was Germany, where youth unemployment rates in 2009 were 
below their pre-recession value. Table 1 thus establishes that youth unemployment 
rates have generally trended upwards between 1970 and 2009, but that particularly 
rapid increases took place in some countries during 2008 and 2009. Increases in youth 
unemployment by country have varied widely since the onset of recession. 
Unemployment rates increased generally during the recession. Therefore it is 
reasonable to question whether the young have suffered disproportionately. We have 
previously argued that young workers are consistently more likely to be unemployed 
than adults (Bell and Blanchflower, 2009, 2010a, 2011). But one way to establish this 
statistically is to calculate the ratio of youth to adult unemployment rates. This is a 
useful measure of whether youth or adults are experiencing greater difficulties in the 
labour market.  
Youth-adult unemployment rate ratios for a number of countries are shown in Table 2. 
These are drawn from the same OECD data as used in Table 1. For the OECD as a 
whole, the ratio of youth to adult rates in 2009 reached its highest level since 1975-
1979. At that time, the overall OECD unemployment rate was 4.8 per cent. In 2009, it 
was 6.9 per cent. Thus, although the youth-adult unemployment ratio was the same in 
both periods, the OECD youth unemployment rate itself was 20.9 per cent in 2009 
compared with 10.4 per cent in 2005-09. The Great Recession was associated with 
high absolute rates of youth unemployment and high rates relative to adults. 
The youth-adult ratio varies considerably between countries, reflecting both 
institutional and policy differences as well as differences in the demand and supply of 
labour. The US ratio is relatively low largely because unemployment rates among 
older workers are relatively high. Youth-adult ratios in some countries, such as Italy, 
Australia and France, have fallen over time, while in others, such as the UK and 
Sweden, the young have tended to comprise an increasing share of the unemployed. 
Further confirmation with more recent data of the worsening position of youth is 
shown in Table 3. Drawn from Eurostat data, it shows unemployment rates for youth 
and adults in 2008 Q1 and 2010 Q4 and the changes in these rates over this interval. 
The final column shows the difference between the change in the youth rate and the   6
change in the adult rate. The countries are ordered by change in the youth 
unemployment rate between 2008 Q1 and 2010 Q4. Youth unemployment rates have 
increased most in the Baltic States, Spain, Ireland and Slovakia, Cyprus and Greece. 
Most of these countries have been affected by construction "bubbles" and/or 
sovereign debt crises. They also tend to be the countries where the growth in youth 
unemployment rates has substantially exceeded the growth in adult rates as shown in 
the final column. At the other end of the spectrum, Germany and Austria, countries 
which avoided the worst effects of the financial collapse, have actually experienced 
youth rates growing less than adult rates between 2008 and 2010. But these are very 
much the exceptions: the general conclusion from Table 3, confirming those of Tables 
1 and 2, is that the Great Recession has been associated with much more rapid growth 
in youth than adult unemployment rates. 
To analyse the relationship between youth and adult unemployment rates over time 
and over countries, we regress the youth unemployment rate on the adult rate 
including both time and country dummies using the 1970-2009 OECD data that 
underlies Tables 1 and 2. We include one further right-hand side variable – the ratio 
of the labour force aged 16-24 to that aged 25-64. This is intended to capture the 
effects of changes in relative cohort size (and therefore age-specific labour supply) 
following Freeman (1979). The pattern of time dummies indicates how far individual 
years differ from the overall relationship between youth and adult rates, while the 
country dummies indicate which countries are performing better or worse than the 
international average. This is purely a descriptive analysis, which takes no account of 
changes in the relative price of youth and adult labour or in their relative marginal 
products. 
Our estimates confirm the cyclical sensitivity of youth unemployment
2.  Youth rates 
change by 1.79% for each 1% change in adult rates. Further, increases in the relative 
size of the youth labour force are associated with small increases in youth 
unemployment. The estimates suggest that a 10% increase in ratio of the youth to 
adult labour force at its mean value (28.5%) is associated with a 0.5% increase in the 
youth unemployment rate. 
Values of the time and country dummy variables are shown in Figures 1 and 2 
respectively. The time dummies show that the major increase in youth rates relative to 
those of adults took place between 1970 and 1981. A substantial reduction in youth 
rates relative to adults followed but ended in 1989. From then until 2007 there was a 
steady upward trend, reflecting more difficult labour market conditions for young 
people seeking a job. This coincided with a period when unemployment was falling in 
most OECD labour markets. However, Figure 2 shows that, since the onset of the 
Great Recession, there was an acceleration of the relative deterioration of youth rates. 
Thus, in 2009, conditional on adult rates, youth unemployment rates were 8% above 
their 1970 value. 
                                                 
2 The estimated equation is: 
youth rate  =    -0.07     + 1.79 adult rate + 0.20 labour force ratio + time and country dummies 
    (-4.25)      (40.05)    (5.96)                                         (t-ratios in brackets) 
N  = 760, R
2 = 0.9177   7
The country dummies reflect differences between youth and adult rates throughout the 
period. The recent recession will only have a limited impact on them. They show a 
clear pattern, with Mediterranean countries having significantly higher rates of youth 
unemployment than most of those in Northern Europe and other parts of the 
developed world. These differences may reflect rigidities in Mediterranean labour 
markets, such as high levels of job protection afforded to permanent contract workers 
in Spain or greater willingness of parents to continue to support children at home in 
these societies.  
To further reinforce the view that youth unemployment during the Great Recession 
has been relatively high, we present micro-econometric evidence from a different data 
source. In Table 4 we show how the incidence of unemployment has changed since 
the start of the Great Recession in the 27 member countries of the European Union.  
We make use of micro data from three Eurobarometer surveys from February 2008 
(#69.1; #69.2 and #70.1) and compare them with the most recent data files available 
from two surveys from the latter half of 2009 (#72.1 & #72.2) through to February 
2010 (#73.1). For the EU27 the overall unemployment rate was 8.6% in February 
2010 compared with 6.7% in February 2008.  In total we have approximately 88,000 
observations. 
We use this analysis to highlight a further dimension of the youth unemployment 
issue – the role of education. As we shall see, unemployment rates tend to be higher 
among the poorly qualified young. To quantify this effect, we estimate the probability 
that an individual is unemployed conditional on age, gender, year and education. The 
sample is set equal to the labour force. Thus, we exclude the inactive young not in 
education who would tend to further highlight the difficulties of the young.  Their 
exclusion largely stems from the lack of consistent data on this group through time 
and by country. However, it is worth noting that in England and Wales, for which 
consistent data are available, the proportion of 16 to 24 year olds not in education, 
employment or training increased by only 2.5 per cent between 2007 Q4 and 2010 Q4 
– much less than the increase in the youth unemployment rate (Source: Department of 
Education). 
Column 1 restricts the sample to 2008. Column 2 pools 2009 and 2010, while the final 
column pools all time periods.  First, it is apparent from the change in the coefficient 
of the under 25 dummy that the share of unemployment accounted for by the young 
has risen during the recession.  This is confirmed by the significant interaction terms 
in the final column which shows the incidence of unemployment increasingly falling 
on the young during this recession, consistent with the OECD data. Second, the more 
educated are less likely to experience unemployment, and this effect has increased 
during the recession. This is shown by the increasingly negative coefficient on those 
who left school at age twenty or above in 2009-10.  This is consistent with the 
unconditional statistics which show that across all age groups, those with higher 
qualifications experience lower unemployment rates. According to Eurobarometer 
#73.1, which surveyed respondents in the EU27 between January and February 2010, 
the weighted EU27 average unemployment rates by education attainment suggested 
unemployment rates of 7.2% for individuals who left school at age 20 or above; 
15.2% for those who left between 16 and 19 and 20.8% for those who left school 
earlier. However, these educational differences are measured across all age groups:   8
They do not isolate the impact of educational attainment on the unemployment 
experiences of those aged less than 25. We return to this issue subsequently. 
These analyses of youth unemployment and youth-adult unemployment ratios do not 
tell the full story of the difficulties face by youth during the recession. Bell and 
Blanchflower (2010b) establish that in the UK at least, the young are underemployed, 
in the sense of being more likely to work part-time even though they would prefer 
full-time and to be in temporary jobs rather than in permanent ones. Those aged under 
25 also state a preference to work more hours while older workers would like to 
reduce their hours. Young people that are out of the labour force are more likely to 
describe themselves as wishing to have a job than are older inactive people.  Even 
though these effects suggest greater excess supply of labour among the young, they 
are not captured by the unemployment rate. 
Another key influence on recorded unemployment is participation. For younger age 
groups, participation rates were negatively correlated with unemployment rates during 
the Great Recession, suggesting a discouraged worker effect. Using the same OECD 
labour market data as previously, a simple regression of changes in participation rates 
between 2007 and 2009 for those aged 16-24 on changes in unemployment rates for 
the same age group yielded a coefficient of -0.65, significant at the 5% level. Thus, 
the increase in youth unemployment has been accompanied by a decline in 
participation. One symptom of this is the increase in applications for tertiary 
education from young people. Although students may still take part-time work and 
thus not drop out of the labour market completely, the reduction in the opportunity 
cost of study makes investment in human capital more attractive.  In both the UK and 
the USA, college applications increased significantly during 2010.  This is consistent 
with the evidence of Clark (forthcoming) that student enrolment rises during 
recessions. 
Another influence on recorded youth unemployment is migration, which tends to be 
concentrated among the young. Ireland and Spain experienced reductions in 
participation much lower than predicted by our estimated relationship between 
changes in unemployment and changes in participation. The reduction in participation 
in Ireland may have been attenuated by emigration. In 2009, Ireland experienced its 
first net emigration since 1995 (Central Statistics Office Ireland, 2010). During 2009, 
after the onset of recession, net migration from Ireland of those in the 15-24 age group 
exceeded total net migration – there was still net immigration in other age groups. 
Thus, age-selective emigration may have reduced the youth-adult unemployment ratio 
in Ireland. The recession also had a dramatic effect on flows of migrants into and out 
of Spain. In 2008 and 2009, the number of workers in Spain on permanent contracts 
declined by 52,000, while the number on permanent contracts fell by 1.33 million3. 
Scarpetta et al (2010) argue that many of those on temporary contracts were either 
migrants or young people: 
 “The incidence of temporary contracts differs a lot across countries. At least 
half of all young workers have a temporary contract in Poland, Spain, 
                                                 
3 
http://extranjeros.mtas.es/es/ObservatorioPermanenteInmigracion/Publicaciones/archivos/Inmigracion_
_Mercado_de_Trabajo_OPI25.pdf   9
Sweden, Portugal, France, Germany and Switzerland. But this proportion 
falls to 20% or less in Hungary, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, 
Turkey and the United Kingdom.” 
As mentioned above, there are also important contrasts between the young. For 
example, in the USA, the increase in youth unemployment has been particularly 
concentrated among young men. Data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics show that 
the unemployment rate for males aged 16 to 24 increased from 12.7% in 2008Q1 to 
22.0% in 2009Q4: for females the equivalent increase was only from 10.2% to 15.9%. 
In the EU, the increase has been more balanced across the sexes, with Eurostat data 
indicating an increase from 14.6% to 21.3% for men aged 16-24 and from 14.9% to 
20.1% for women in the same age group between 2008 Q1 and 2010 Q4.  
Another important distinction is in educational attainment. Table 5 contains 
information on changes in youth unemployment by educational qualification in the 
EU.  Three categories of education are defined: those with primary or more secondary 
qualifications; those with upper secondary or some form of non-tertiary education and 
those with tertiary level qualifications. Where available, data are shown for 2008 Q1 
and 2009 Q3. 
It is not clear that during the Great Recession increases in youth unemployment have 
been concentrated on the poorly educated. In the EU as a whole, rates of 
unemployment among those with a tertiary education qualification have risen more 
sharply than have those with primary or secondary qualifications, albeit from a lower 
base. Thus in Belgium, Italy and a number of eastern European states, unemployment 
rates among graduates are higher than those with a secondary qualification. One 
possible explanation is a genuine oversupply of graduates with relatively high 
reservation wages. An alternative explanation focuses on differences in labour market 
experience. Within the 16-24 years age group, graduates tend to have less work 
experience than the poorly qualified. If employers’ immediate reaction to a recession 
is to stop hiring, then graduates may be in a more difficult position than those with 
lower qualifications, who already have jobs and accumulated experience. 
On the demand side of the labour market, it appears that employment opportunities 
for young workers have been declining more rapidly than those for older employees. 
Thus, changes in relative demand for labour by age group may partly explain the 
relative increase in unemployment rates among the young. Table 6 shows how 
employment by age group changed since the start of the recession. Three age groups 
are shown: those between 15 and 24; those of prime working age (between 25 and 49) 
and older workers aged 50 and above. The table shows the percentage change in 
employment by age group and country for the period 2008 Q1 to 20010 Q3. Data are 
from Eurostat. Data are sorted by the percentage change in youth employment. 
There is a clear contrast in almost all countries between the experience of younger and 
older workers during the recession.  Youth employment has fallen sharply in many 
countries but in Ireland, the Baltic States, Spain and Portugal the falls in employment 
all exceed 25 per cent. The experience of older workers has been quite different: in 
many countries there has been an increase in the employment of older workers. Thus, 
for example, in Germany, employment among young people fell by 6%, while the 
employment of workers aged 50 and over increased by 12%. In Spain, employment of   10
the young fell by 32%, of the middle-aged by 10%, but there was a 3% increase in the 
employment of older workers. This pattern was replicated in several other countries 
including the UK, Italy, Poland, Portugal, and Ireland. For the European Union as a 
whole, employment of youths fell by 8%, prime age workers by 3%, but there has 
been a 7% increase in the employment of older workers’ employment. Changes in 
these age-specific employment rates are clearly indicative of substantial age 
rebalancing in the labour market and form part of the explanation of spiralling youth 
unemployment rates. 
Next, we consider policy responses to the Great Recession, particularly those focused 
on the labour market. These were mostly put in place during 2008 and 2009. They 
largely overlaid the ALMP policies already in place and are summarised in OECD 
(2009). They included measures to stimulate labour demand, to help the unemployed 
find work and to enhance training. Thus, for example, Germany reduced employee 
and employer unemployment insurance contribution rates; introduced schemes to 
subsidise short-time working (STW); increased staffing in the public employment 
service (PES) and increased funding for training. The Spanish government reduced 
employers’ social contribution for the first two years for new employees; reduced 
social contributions for young people setting up businesses and extended subsidies for 
hiring part-time workers; increased PES activity and increased funding for training 
and vocational education. Sweden deferred two months of employer social security 
contributions from 2009 to 2011; increased hiring subsidies and made them more 
widely available; expanded post-school vocational training and realigned higher-
education resources with demand. The US government expanded tax credits to 
employers hiring unemployed veterans or “disconnected” youth (those not employed 
or education); expanded funding for youth activities with particular emphasis on 
providing summer job opportunities for young people and projects employing “at-
risk” youth; provided grants for training in high-growth and emerging industry sectors 
and extended the Emergency Unemployment Compensation program which provides 
additional weeks of benefits. 
The UK government established a package for those unemployed for more than six 
months, which included a recruitment subsidy of £1,000 for employers who hire those 
in receipt of JSA for six months or more. It also expanded PES activities. It 
announced the Young Person’s Guarantee at the 2009 Budget with the aim of 
addressing youth unemployment. It pledged “a guaranteed job, training or work 
placement for all 18-24 year olds who reach 12 months unemployed to ensure no 
young people are left behind due to long-term unemployment". In support of this 
guarantee, the Future Jobs Fund was established with a budget of £1bn. It was 
intended to create up to 100,000 new jobs for young people, and a further 50,000 
specifically targeted in areas of high unemployment. Spending on the Future Jobs 
Fund was reduced by £320m as part of the austerity measures introduced by the 
Coalition Government. The argument was that the provision of temporary jobs 
through the Young Person'’ Guarantee was an “ineffective” use of public funds (HM 
Treasury 2010). 
All OECD countries have introduced some labour market measures specifically to 
combat the adverse effects of the “Great Recession”. These cover a wide range of 
labour market characteristics – wage and non-wage labour costs, labour demand, 
income support, training and search activity. These vary both in character and in   11
scale. Some, but by no means all, are specifically aimed at the particular difficulties 
faced by young people. Nevertheless, youth unemployment remains at high levels in 
most OECD countries. 
Given the rapidity of the introduction of new labour market policies to combat the 
recession, levels of displacement and deadweight loss are as yet largely unknown. 
Unlike the ALMPs discussed previously, these recently introduced measures have not 
been subject to rigorous evaluation. It is difficult to construct credible counterfactuals 
and cross-country comparisons may be the only available evidence at present. Yet 
policies that have improved outcomes in some countries may be less successful in 
other jurisdictions due to institutional or implementation differences. Nevertheless, 
there is clearly a need for effective interventions, because as we see in the next 
section, unemployment has a number of adverse effects particularly for the young. 
3.  What Do We Know About Youth Unemployment? 
There is a large literature on youth unemployment, drawing on the experience of 
recent decades. In this section we draw on this literature in attempting to answer six 
questions regarding the workings of the youth labour market. 
 
1) Is youth unemployment cyclical or structural? 
Clark and Summers (1982), in their classic study of the dynamics of youth joblessness 
argue that the problem of teenage unemployment arises from a shortage of jobs. 
"Aggregate demand has a potent impact on the job prospects and market experience 
of teenagers" (1982, p.230).  Freeman and Wise (1982), for example, found in their 
study of youth joblessness in the 1970s that it was concentrated, by and large, among 
a small group who lacked work for extended periods of time. Over half of the male 
teenage unemployment they examined was among those who were out of work for 
over six months, a group constituting less than 10% of the youth labor force and only 
7% of the youth population. Freeman and Wise reported that the youths who make up 
the relatively small group that was chronically without work had distinctive 
characteristics. They were disproportionately black; disproportionately high school 
dropouts, and disproportionately residents of deprived areas.  
 
Blanchflower and Freeman (2000) identified one basic pattern in the job market for 
young workers: the disproportionately large response of youth employment or 
unemployment to changes in overall unemployment. They argued that the sensitivity 
of youth employment and unemployment to the overall rate of unemployment 
dominate sizable demographic and structural changes favorable to youth in 
determining how youths fare in the job market.  Recently OECD (2008) confirmed 
this conclusion "Youth unemployment rates are more sensitive to business-cycle 
conditions than the adult unemployment rate and this high-sensitivity tends to decline 
progressively with age". Our estimate of the relationship between youth and adult 
rates in Section 3 indicates that youth unemployment rates change by around 1.79 per 
cent for every percent change in adult rates, indicating a high degree of cyclical 
sensitivity.  
 
Consistent with this argument, there is evidence that young people do well in booms.  
Freeman and Rodgers (2000) analyzed the 1990s boom in the United States and found 
that it substantially improved the position of non-college educated young men, 
especially young African Americans who are the most disadvantaged and troubled 
group in the US.  Young men in tight labor markets experienced a substantial boost in   12
both employment and earnings. Adult men had no gains and their earnings barely 
changed even in areas where unemployment rates were below 4%.  
 
There is also evidence of state dependence in youth unemployment. In this context, 
state dependence means that the experience of one spell of unemployment of itself 
increases the probability of further spells. This may be because on the demand side, 
employers are less willing to hire those with a record of unemployment or that, on the 
supply side, the experience of unemployment discourages individuals from job search 
activity. 
 
State dependence would imply extended or repeated unemployment spells. These 
might attenuate the apparent cyclical sensitivity of youth unemployment in aggregate 
data, leading to the conclusion that youth unemployment is partly structural. And it is 
clear that some aggregate changes in youth unemployment are not directly linked to 
cyclical movements. Thus the ILO (2008) noted that recently there had been a 
declining  trend in youth unemployment, suggesting that the world rate of youth 
unemployment rose from 10.9% in 1999 to a peak in 2004 of 12.6% and subsequently 
declined to 11.9 per cent by 2007.  This is not a very large reduction and came at a 
time when there was a substantial policy effort to combat youth unemployment. This 
relatively small improvement was swiftly overtaken by events after the onset of 
recession. 
 
2) How has changed school enrolment impacted on youth unemployment? 
Most OECD countries have tried to extend the duration of formal schooling in recent 
decades. This delays entrance into full-time employment, but not necessarily part-time 
work. For example, the proportion of the young in the UK in full-time education 
increased from 26% in 1993 to 38% in 2007. Recent OECD data suggests that the 
proportion of the young who are in school is considerably higher in, for example, 
Belgium (60%); Finland (56%); France (61%), Italy (57%); Luxembourg (69%) and 
Sweden (57%).  These levels reflect a belief in most industrial countries that greater 
investment in human capital is required to maintain competitiveness, but they may 
also reflect lowering costs of education as average family sizes fall. Yet again, it may 
be a defensive strategy, with enrollment increasing when the labour market 
deteriorates. For example, in 2010, applications to UK universities increased by 22 
per cent over the previous year
4, reflecting the fall in employment opportunities 
shown in Table 6. 
 
One effect of increased educational participation is that the 16-24 cohort is now, on 
average, better qualified than in previous recessions.  The UK Labour Force Survey 
indicates that 5.8 per cent of 16-24 year olds were graduates in 1993, while that share 
had risen to 13.2 per cent by 2008. The improvement in qualifications is more 
concentrated among females than males. By 2008, the proportion of females aged 18-
24 with no qualifications had fallen to 4.6 per cent, but for males was still over 7 per 
cent. Changes in attainment by gender reflect changes in schooling rates. For 
example, in the US, the proportion of 16 to 19 year old enrolled in either high school 
or college increased by 8.9% between 1979 and 2003. But female enrolment increased 
by 14.1%, much more rapidly (Congressional Budget Office 2004).  
                                                 
4 See UCAS (UK Universities Admission Service) 
http://www.ucas.ac.uk/about_us/media_enquiries/media_releases/2010/080210    13
 
Increased schooling affects youth unemployment in two ways. First, so long as 
increased educational attainment is increasing the “employability” of the young, it 
should increase the success rate of their job search activity. On the other hand, 
delayed job market entry caused by additional schooling may reduce the average 
“employability” of those that are economically active, since those selected into 
additional schooling are likely to be more able. This effect may be difficult to 
disentangle within aggregate statistics, since some of those taking additional 
schooling may also be economically active and therefore classified as either employed 
or unemployed. 
 
3) Has youth unemployment increased because of competition from migrants? 
One potential cause of increases in youth unemployment is competition from 
migrants. In the UK, there is some evidence that suggests that the influx of 
immigrants from the A8 Accession countries from 2004 onward had some negative 
impact on the employment of the least skilled young people (Blanchflower and 
Shadforth 2009).  But these effects are usually insignificant or when significant, quite 
small.  Card (2009) can find no compelling evidence of a causal impact running from 
immigration to youth unemployment, though he does argue that competition between 
unskilled youth and immigrants in the lower tail of the earnings distribution may have 
increased inequality. There is little empirical support for the notion that increased 
migration is a root cause of higher rates of youth unemployment. However, these 
analyses generally precede the Great Recession and as we have seen, net emigration 
from countries like Ireland and Spain is now keeping youth unemployment rates 
below what they would otherwise be. These migrant flows comprise both natives and 
returning immigrants. 
 
4) Are co-habitation decisions influenced by youth unemployment? 
The time when older children leave home is influenced by, and influences, labour 
market status. Children who remain with their parents gain from intra-household 
transfers and reduced housing costs. The decision to cohabit is also a form of 
insurance against unemployment risk. This may affect labour supply decisions. Card 
and Lemieux (2000) find that when the labour market is performing poorly, the 
fraction of youth living with parents increases. But, in addition to labour market 
effects, cohabitation decisions are also significantly impacted, by welfare systems, 
housing markets and culture (Chiuri and Del Boca 2008). The welfare costs of high 
youth unemployment may be lower in cultures where there is widespread social 
acceptance of children staying with their parents well beyond completion of school. In 
Mediterranean countries cohabitation with adult children is more common than in 
Northern Europe and this effect may be stronger. This is consistent with our evidence 
from Section 3 that, ceteris paribus, youth unemployment rates are considerably 
higher in Mediterranean countries.  
 
5) Have youth wages been too high, so increasing youth unemployment? 
Recent movements in the ratio of youth to adult wages in the UK and USA are shown 
in Figure 3. Both show a secular decline from the early part of this century, some 
recovery around 2007-2008 followed by further decline during the recession. 
Employment among older workers has increased during the recession, even though 
these data suggest that their relative wages have been increasing compared with those 
of young people in the UK and USA. There is no prima facie evidence of younger   14
workers pricing themselves out of jobs. In the UK, this finding is confirmed by 
analyses of the effect of the minimum wage on employment. A minimum wage was 
introduced to the UK in 1997 but there is little or no evidence to sustain the argument 
that it has had an adverse effect on employment (see e.g. Metcalf, 2008). Even if this 
effect were strong, it would not explain the sudden increase in youth unemployment 
during this recession.  
 
High levels of unionisation among younger workers might raise their relative pay, but 
reduce their employment prospects. Unions generally operate rates for the job, which 
would have the effect of raising the relative wage of the young, making them 
relatively less attractive to employers.  But, although the UK, for example, has 
relatively high youth unemployment rates, it has especially low union membership 
rates among the young. Blanchflower (2007) shows, using data from the UK Labour 
Force Survey, that union density rates for 16-19 year olds in 2004 were 4.3%.  In 
2007 the union density rate for 16-24 year olds was 9.8% (Mercer and Notley, 2008, 
Table 25). It does not appear that youths are pricing themselves out of work, unless 
their relative productivity is falling especially sharply, but there is no evidence to 
suggest this. 
 
6) Have young workers been adversely affected by changes in the demand for skills? 
The changing structure of labour demand may also be adversely affect young 
people’s labour market prospects. A common explanation put forward to support this 
view is that of skill biased technical change. Technical change increased the skill 
requirements of production, leaving the unskilled, and particularly the young 
unskilled, at a significant disadvantage in the labour market (see e.g. Berman et al. 
1994). 
 
In the US, it is argued that industrial change has led to a significant change in the 
demand for skills (Autor, Levy, and Murnane 2003).  Rather than additions to labour 
demand being entirely focused on high-skilled jobs, there has been some increase in 
demand for low-skilled workers. Many such jobs involve non-routine, or interactive, 
tasks that cannot be easily automated. In contrast, the demand for skilled workers 
whose work can be routinised has fallen, mainly due to IT-based automation. In the 
past, such workers’ pay was typically close to the centre of the earnings distribution. 
The loss of these jobs means that the earnings distribution has been "hollowed out", 
making the progression from low to high skilled work more difficult. For the poorly 
educated young, this may mean that there are fewer opportunities to progress from 
manual work through the various stages to management. However, any such effect is 
likely to be long-term rather than a direct result of the present recession. 
 
We now discuss the adverse effects of youth unemployment, both at the personal and 
societal level, arguing that unemployment when young has more negative outcomes 
than spells of unemployment later in life. 
 
4.  What impact does youth unemployment have? 
There is a wealth of literature showing that unemployment is a stressful life event that 
directly makes reduces individual wellbeing. This applies not just to the unemployed, 
but also may affect the employed due to increased anxiety over job security. 
Unemployment increases susceptibility to malnutrition, illness, mental stress, and loss 
of self-esteem, and increases the risk of depression. The unemployed also appear to be   15
at higher risk of committing suicide, and of poor physical health outcomes later in 
life. Low levels of happiness and health have predictive power for subsequent 
outcomes.  For example, happy people heal faster, have longer life expectancies, are 
less likely to get coronary heart disease and, from lab experiments, have higher 
productivity (Oswald, Proto and Sgroi, 2010) and creativity (Amabile et al, 2005). 
Knabe and Ratzel (forthcoming) argue that past unemployment affects individuals’ 
future expectations negatively and that it is this insecurity about future prospects that 
reduces their present well-being.  However, drawing the distinction between 
experienced utility and well-being, Knabe et al.(forthcoming) argue that the 
unemployed feel sadder than the employed when engaged in similar activities, but can 
compensate by taking part in more enjoyable activities when the employed are at 
work. 
 
Youth unemployment also has particularly adverse social impacts. Higher 
unemployment is associated with increases in burglaries, thefts and drug offences. 
Unemployment is often part of the cycle where involvement in crime reduces 
subsequent employment prospects and consequently increases the probability of 
participating in crime. There is new evidence that even young people who choose to 
go to college or university are hurt if they enter the labour market during a recession.  
Kahn (2010) has shown that graduating from college during a recession has large, 
negative and persistent effects on wages.  Lifetime earnings are substantially lower 
than they would have been if the graduate had entered the labour market in good 
times.  Furthermore, cohorts who graduate in worse national economies tend to end 
up in lower-level occupations.  Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2009) suggest that the 
period of early adulthood (between 18 and 25) seems to be the age range during 
which people are more sensitive to macroeconomic conditions.  They find that being 
exposed to a recession before age 17 or after age 25 has no impact on beliefs about 
life chances.  However, youngsters growing up during recessions tend to believe that 
success in life depends more on luck than on effort; they support more government 
redistribution, but have less confidence in public institutions.  Recessions seem to 
adversely effect youngsters’ beliefs. 
 
There is also recent evidence on the consequences of rising unemployment on young 
people from the UK.  The Prince’s Trust, which was established by the Prince of 
Wales, conducted three surveys of young people in 2009 and 2010.  In comparison 
with other young people, the young unemployed were significantly more likely to feel 
ashamed, rejected, lost, anxious, insecure, down and depressed, isolated and unloved.  
They were also significantly less happy with their health, friendships and family life 
than those in work or studying, much less confident of the future and more likely to 
say that they had turned to drugs, that they had nothing to look forward to and that 
their life had no direction.  Many reported having suicidal thoughts (Blanchflower, 
2010). 
 
Further, unemployment while young, especially of long duration, appears to be 
associated with permanent scars rather than the temporary blemishes that result for 
older workers (Ellwood, 1984).  The majority of older workers get over spells of 
unemployment reasonably quickly while youngsters do not as they struggle to find a 
toe-hold in the labour market.  The scarring effect of youth unemployment has two 
components: first, for the young, a spell of unemployment does not end with that 
spell; it raises the probability of being unemployed in later years. Second early spells   16
of unemployment also carry a wage penalty. These effects are much larger than for 
older people experiencing unemployment.  Mroz and Savage (2006) find that a six 
month spell of unemployment at age 22 results in an 8 per cent lower wage at 23 and 
even at ages 30 and 31, wages are 2-3 per cent lower than they otherwise would have 
been. 
 
We can now update the evidence on the scarring effects of youth unemployment in 
the UK.  We find new evidence that spells of youth unemployment have harmful 
impacts on a number of outcomes, such as happiness, health and job satisfaction, 
many years later. This builds on earlier work by Clark and Oswald (1994) and 
Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1998) who showed that unemployment lowers 
happiness. 
 
In order to explore the impact of unemployment while young on subsequent outcomes 
we examined data from the 1958 birth cohort, the National Child Development Study 
(NCDS).  The NCDS is a continuing longitudinal study that seeks to follow the lives 
of all those living in Great Britain who were born in one particular week in 1958.  To 
date there have been eight attempts to trace all members of the birth cohort in order to 
monitor their physical, educational and social development. The first three follow-up 
sweeps were carried out in 1965, when respondents were aged 7, in 1969 (NCDS1), 
aged 11 (NCDS2), in 1974, aged 16 (NCDS3). The fourth sweep, NCDS4, was 
conducted in 1981, when respondents were aged 23. The fifth, sixth and seventh 
sweeps were carried out at ages 33, 41-42 and 46-47. The latest sweep (NCDS8) was 
conducted between August 2008 and May 2009, coinciding with the onset of the 
Great Recession. 
 
We have information from the 1981 sweep on the number of months the respondent 
had been unemployed between the ages of 16 and 23.  This is obtained from reports of 
the duration of up to four spells of unemployment.  Unemployment rates in the UK 
had risen from 5.4% in 1979 to 6.8% in 1980 and 9.6% in 1981, when the UK had 
moved into recession.  Unemployment eventually peaked at 11.4% in the spring of 
1984.  In the sample, 44.6% reported that at some time in their working lives they had 
been unemployed. For those who had been unemployed, the mean number of months 
they had been unemployed was 7.8 (SD=8.4). 
 
We model various measures of wellbeing using responses obtained from NCDS8 
when the respondents were age 50. In addition to the controls for region, education 
and gender, we also include a standard set of controls for well-being equations 
(Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004a, 2004b 2011). These comprise labour market 
status, marital status, smoker status and whether the respondent exercises.  In addition 
to the months of unemployment variable we also include an indicator variable on 
mental health at age 23 measured by the malaise score (indicating a tendency towards 
depression). For a study using the NCDS Malaise scores at ages 23 and 33, see 
Cheung and Buchanan (1997). We also include birth weight, obtained at the time of 
the respondent's birth, and which remarkably impacts life satisfaction half a century 
later. 
 
The results show that youth unemployment continues to hurt two decades later for the 
four 2008/9 outcome variables listed above.  Interestingly, in all four cases we also 
included controls for whether the individual was unemployed at age 33 when   17
interviewed in NCDS5, but these variables were everywhere insignificant and as they 
reduced sample sizes were excluded. If the characteristics we seek to model were 
simply fixed effects that were also associated with unemployment, then one would 
expect unemployment at age 33 to have a significant explanatory role. Our analysis 
suggests, however, that spells of unemployment experiences after age 23 have little 
bearing on later well-being. Our full set of results are reported in Table 7.  We look at 
the four outcomes in turn. 
 
i) Life satisfaction.  Respondents in NCDS8 were asked "On a scale from 0 to 10, 
where ‘0’ means that you are completely dissatisfied and ‘10’ means that you are 
completely satisfied, what number corresponds with how satisfied or dissatisfied you 
are with the way life has turned out so far?"  The mean life satisfaction score was 
7.29 and 7.45 if the respondent had not been unemployed at all by age 23 or before 
and 7.12 if they had.  Column 1 reports the results of estimating an ordered logit.  
Most of the results are standard; life satisfaction is higher for married people, the 
educated, workers, especially those who work full-time, and those who are not 
disabled or sick or depressed (a low malaise score at age 23).  Those currently 
unemployed are less happy; there are enduring effects from spells of unemployment 
while young, which continues to lower happiness more than two decades later.  Clark 
et al (2001) also found, using panel data for Germany from the GSOEP that past 
unemployment lowers life satisfaction.  
 
In column 1 it is apparent that, as is consistently found in all happiness equations, the 
current unemployed are less happy.  Also, the longer the spell of unemployment 
before the age of twenty-three, the lower is happiness nearly thirty years later at age 
50.  Astonishingly, birth weight is positively correlated with happiness many years 
later even in the presence of all the controls.  To our knowledge this finding has not 
been reported before. 
 
ii) Health status.  Respondents in NCDS8 were asked in general would you say your 
health is - 1=excellent; 2=good; 3=fair; 4=poor or 5= very poor?" Of those who had 
been unemployed in NCDS4 23.5% said they were in poor or fair health compared 
with 14.1% of those who had not been unemployed.   Column 2 of Table 7 estimates 
an ordered logit with self-reported health as the dependent variable.  Once again the 
youth unemployment variable enters significantly and negative, whereas being 
unemployed at age 33 did not have a significant impact on health (not reported).  The 
Malaise score is strongly negative also.  The currently unemployed are less healthy 
than full-time employees. The longer the spell of unemployment while young the 
lower the happiness when they are older. Birth weight is positive and weakly 
significant. 
 
iii) Respondents were also asked to answer yes or no in answer to the question 'Do 
you often feel miserable or depressed?'  We use this as the dependent variable in 
Column 3 of Table 7.  Once again spells of unemployment increase depression years 
later and more so the longer is the spell.    
 
iv) Job satisfaction.  Workers were asked for their degree of satisfaction with their 
current job.  Possible answers were “very dissatisfied; somewhat dissatisfied; neither; 
somewhat satisfied and very satisfied”.  Column 4 reports the results of estimating an 
ordered logit. Controls are also included to reflect the degree of job security the   18
individual has.  Job insecurity lowers job satisfaction (Blanchflower and Oswald, 
2011) Youth unemployment lowers job satisfaction whereas middle-age 
unemployment did not.   
 
People are impacted adversely, in terms of reduced wellbeing, by increases in 
unemployment.  The unemployed themselves lose their jobs and income, but there is a 
much wider loss of wellbeing. High national unemployment lowers wellbeing 
especially of the unemployed.  It turns out that spells of unemployment are especially 
harmful to the individual - and to society - when young people become unemployed.  
A spell of unemployment when young continues to have a negative impact in later 
life. And the longer the initial spell of unemployment the larger the subsequent 
negative impact. Clearly any conclusion that such effects will be observed among 
those young people affected by the current recession is based on the assumption that 
such effects are not cohort based (i.e. specific to those born in 1958). With this 
important proviso, our results add to the range of evidence on the negative personal 
and social impacts of youth unemployment associated with the Great Recession. Our 
new evidence is consistent with the view that negative impacts on life satisfaction, 
health and job satisfaction may persist well into the future.  
 
5.  Conclusion 
Unemployment increased in most OECD countries during the Great Recession. But it 
increased more rapidly among the young. Youth unemployment rates have been 
increasing relative to adult rates for some time, but the recession increased the size of 
the gap. Unemployment rates alone do not capture the extent of excess supply in the 
youth labour market. Other indicators, such as part-time working, working-time 
preferences and increased migration suggest that younger age groups are more 
supply-constrained than other age groups by reduced levels of labour demand during 
the recession. We also know that the age-specific demand for employment has 
changed significantly in favour of older workers since the onset of the Great 
Recession. This change has taken place very quickly and therefore is unlikely to be a 
response to factors that evolve slowly – such as relative wages or technological 
change. One potential culprit is labour market regulations that make it easier to cut 
young workers. 
Increases in youth unemployment have not been uniform. Some countries, particularly 
those that have been affected by sovereign debt crises or construction bubbles, such as 
the Baltic States, Greece, Ireland, Slovakia and Spain have seen very large increases 
in the rate of youth unemployment. From a longer-run perspective, high rates of youth 
unemployment in Mediterranean countries may also reflect the greater willingness to 
insure family members against the adverse consequences of unemployment than in 
Northern Europe. Countries with large fiscal deficits, such as the UK, are hesitant to 
increase spending on policies focused on youth, an implicit acknowledgement either 
that youth unemployment is not thought to be particularly serious or that deficit 
reduction is more effective in reducing its adverse consequences than policies 
specifically targeted on youth unemployment. 
However, we do know that youth unemployment has adverse effects that extend well 
beyond the present. Our paper has added to the evidence on these effects, focusing in 
particular on the delayed negative impacts of unemployment when young on well-
being, health status and job satisfaction. Hence short-run government savings may be   19
at the cost of increased future expenditures associated with the negative effects of 
youth unemployment and with reduced well-being. 
In the aftermath of the recession, OECD Secretary-General Angel Gurría made youth 
unemployment a key policy priority (OECD 2010). But one of the difficulties facing 
governments is in knowing which policies are likely to be effective in reducing youth 
unemployment and do not lead to displacement and deadweight loss. Many policies 
introduced since 2008 are specific responses to the recession. They are overlaid on a 
substantial range of Active Labour Market Policies which seek to address specific 
labour market problems that persisted even though most developed country labour 
markets were performing quite well during the early part of the last decade. These 
particularly included measures to improve the access of disadvantaged youth into the 
labour market. The evaluation literature has given these measures limited support, 
even though they were largely introduced when labour demand was relatively strong. 
And although one might expect that the quality of these measures would increase 
through “learning by doing”, the evidence for this is also limited. It is too early to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the post 2008 measures. Some countries, such as 
Germany, have managed to contain youth unemployment, while others that have 
introduced policies not that dissimilar from Germany, have fared much worse. 
Nevertheless, inaction is not an option when the possible costs of youth 
unemployment are so high. 
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Table 1: Youth Unemployment Rates 1970-2009 (Per Cent) 
 
    1970-74  1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99  2000-04  2005-07 2008  2009 
Australia  3.4  11.3 14.6 13.9 17.1 15.0  12.3  10.0  8.9  11.6 
Austria              5.0  5.7  6.7  9.4  8.1  10.0 
Belgium        24.5  19.9  16.4 21.2  18.3  20.3  18.0  21.9 
Canada      13.2 16.1 13.3 15.7 15.1  13.2  11.7  11.6  15.3 
Denmark        16.4  9.7  12.0  9.1  8.0  8.1  7.6  11.2 
Finland 4.3  10.5  10.2  9.2  22.1  23.5  19.7  17.4  15.7  20.5 
France  3.9  10.8 19.1 22.5 22.3 26.5  19.5  20.1  18.1  22.8 
Germany  1.2  5.1 8.3 7.4 6.4 9.1  9.9  13.5  10.4  11.0 
Greece        23.5  24.9  25.9  30.3 27.6  24.7 22.1 25.8 
Ireland  9.1  12.2 19.1 23.7 22.4 15.2 8.7 9.8  12.5  25.9 
Italy  11.4  20.3 28.5 34.4 30.8 31.9  26.6  22.0  21.3  25.4 
Japan  2.3  3.4 4.2 4.9 4.7 7.3  9.7  8.1  7.2  9.1 
Korea        9.9  8.1  7.6  10.0  10.0  9.7  9.3  9.8 
Luxembourg        6.1  5.1  4.4  7.4  9.5  15.0  17.9  17.2 
Netherlands 2.7  7.3 18.3  16.7 9.9  9.8 6.4  7.3  5.6  7.3 
New Zealand        0.0  0.1  17.2  13.5  11.5  9.9  11.4  16.6 
Norway  5.4 6.2  6.9  7.2  13.0 10.7  11.1  9.3 7.5 9.2 
Portugal  3.2  14.8 16.7 15.2 10.8 13.1  11.9  16.3  16.5  20.0 
Spain  4.9  12.8 34.0 39.2 35.1 35.9  22.6  18.6  24.6  37.9 
Sweden 4.7  5.2  8.3  5.5  14.3  18.6  13.5  20.9  19.4  25.0 
United Kingdom        19.7  14.9  14.5  13.6  11.1  13.5  14.1  18.9 
United  States  11.6  13.7 15.5 12.2 12.9 11.1  11.2  10.8  12.8  17.6 
Europe  4.6  11.1 19.1 19.8 18.1 18.5  17.4  17.1  15.7  20.1 
OECD  countries  5.1  10.4 15.2 15.3 15.3 15.6  14.6  14.5  13.2  20.9 
Sources: 1970-2009 OECD   26
Table 2: Ratio of Unemployment Rates of those Aged 16-24 to Unemployment Rates of those Aged 25-64: 1970-2009 
 
    1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-07 2008 2009 
Australia  2.25   3.26   2.85   2.52   2.28   2.37   2.59   2.76   2.73  2.86 
Austria              1.50   1.54   1.84   2.23   2.53  2.31 
Belgium       2.67   2.26   2.48   2.70   2.94   2.92   3.04  2.97 
Canada     2.30   2.04   1.72   1.71   1.98   2.14   2.16   2.25  2.21 
Denmark        2.13   1.54   1.41   1.74   1.82   2.25   2.97  2.54 
Finland  2.33   2.64   2.42   2.37   2.41   2.08   2.60   2.74   3.18  2.85 
France  2.32   3.11   3.45   2.78   2.49   2.50   2.46   2.79   2.96  2.79 
Germany  1.16   1.50   1.60   1.23   0.94   1.02   1.14   1.34   1.43  1.40 
Greece      4.18   4.93   4.71   3.99   3.26   3.14  3.31  3.18 
Ireland  1.48   1.72   1.66   1.63   1.72   1.79   2.45   2.65   2.71  2.70 
Italy  7.50   7.72   7.12   5.29   4.33   3.69   3.65   3.80   3.77  4.06 
Japan  2.13   1.80   1.94   2.09   2.32   2.17   2.08   2.05   1.89  2.11 
Korea          3.12   3.35   4.37   2.97   3.09   3.06   3.22  2.95 
Luxembourg          3.01   3.13   2.41   3.30   3.71   4.28   4.42  4.65 
Netherlands  1.40   2.37   2.45   1.92   1.71   2.20   2.15   1.90   2.27  2.16 
New Zealand        2.75   2.34   2.49   2.98   3.95   4.14  4.22 
Norway  7.12   5.99   3.99   3.62   3.00   3.59   3.84   3.35   4.23  4.13 
Portugal  5.79   4.33   3.86   3.13   2.69   2.49   2.60   2.24   2.30  2.18 
Spain  3.20   3.35   3.41   2.78   2.23   2.12   2.26   2.47   2.51  2.57 
Sweden  2.77   3.76   3.67   3.09   3.01   2.39   2.81   4.04   4.61  4.39 
United Kingdom      2.07   1.76   1.87   2.24   2.86   3.88   3.79  3.94 
United States  3.29   2.79   2.45   2.50   2.42   2.95   2.72   2.83   2.78  2.90 
OECD  3.0 3.1 3.0 2.6 2.4 2.4 2.6 2.7  2.8  3.1   
Source: OECD Stat Extracts: Labour Force Survey by sex and age   27
Table 3: Youth and Adult Unemployment Rates 2008-2010 (Source: Eurostat) 
  Total  Under 25  25 and over  Difference 
  2008 Q1  2010 Q4  Change  2008 Q1  2010 Q4  Change  2008 Q1  2010 Q4  Change 
Germany   7.6  6.6  -1.0  10.2 8.5  -1.7  7.2 6.3  -0.9 -0.8 
Austria 3.9  4.2  0.3  8.1 8.0  -0.1  3.2 3.6  0.4 -0.5 
Luxembourg 4.4  4.8  0.4  15.4 17.5  2.1  3.5 3.9  0.4 1.7 
Netherlands 3.1  4.4  1.3  6.2 8.3  2.1  2.5 3.6  1.1 1.0 
Norway 2.4  3.5  1.1  6.8 8.9  2.1  1.6 2.6  1.0 1.1 
Turkey 9.0  10.6  1.6  17.0 19.4  2.4  7.1 8.8  1.7 0.7 
Belgium 6.9  8.2  1.3  17.3 20.5  3.2  5.9 7.0  1.1 2.1 
Romania 5.7  7.3  1.6  18.5 21.7  3.2  4.3 5.8  1.5 1.7 
Sweden 5.9  7.9  2.0  19.0 23.6  4.6  3.9 5.5  1.6 3.0 
Finland 6.3  8.0  1.7  15.9 20.7  4.8  4.9 6.3  1.4 3.4 
Slovenia 4.7  7.6  2.9  11.2 16.1  4.9  3.9 6.8  2.9 2.0 
United Kingdom  5.1  7.7  2.6  13.8 19.1  5.3  3.6 5.8  2.2 3.1 
European Union (27 countries)  6.7  9.6  2.9  14.8 20.7  5.9  5.7 8.3  2.6 3.3 
Portugal 7.6  11.2  3.6  15.9 21.9  6.0  6.7 10.4  3.7 2.3 
France 7.6  9.7  2.1  18.0 24.4  6.4  6.4 8.0  1.6 4.8 
Poland 7.5  9.7  2.2  17.8 24.2  6.4  6.3 8.2  1.9 4.5 
Denmark 3.3  7.7  4.4  7.6 14.0  6.4  2.5 6.5  4.0 2.4 
Italy 6.5  8.4  1.9  20.8 27.3  6.5  5.3 7.0  1.7 4.8 
United States  5.0  9.6  4.6  11.5 18.3  6.8  3.9 8.2  4.3 2.5 
Hungary 7.5  11.5  4.0  19.6 27.7  8.1  6.6 10.3  3.7 4.4 
Czech Republic  4.4  7.4  3.0  10.0 18.3  8.3  3.9 6.5  2.6 5.7 
Bulgaria 6.1  10.1  4.0  13.7 23.2  9.5  5.4 8.9  3.5 6.0 
Croatia 8.8  12.9  4.1  22.6 32.5  9.9  7.2 10.2  3.0 6.9 
Greece 7.8  12.9  5.1  22.3 33.4  11.1  6.7 11.5  4.8 6.3 
Cyprus 3.7  7.2  3.5  9.1 20.4  11.3  3.1 5.8  2.7 8.6 
Slovakia 10.1  14.5  4.4  19.1 36.5  17.4  9.1 12.3  3.2 14.2 
Ireland 4.9  13.8  8.9  10.1 28.3  18.2  4.0 12.1  8.1 10.1 
Estonia 4.2  14.3  10.1  7.4 25.9  18.5  3.8 13.0  9.2 9.3 
Spain 9.2  20.5  11.3  20.8 43.0  22.2  7.8 18.4  10.6 11.6 
Latvia 6.1  18.3  12.2  10.9 33.3  22.4  5.4 16.3  10.9 11.5 
Lithuania 4.1  17.4  13.3  8.5 34.4  25.9  3.6 15.6  12.0 13.9   28
Table 4.  Probability of being unemployed, 2008-2010 (dprobit). 
                                                      2008                        2009-2010               2008-2010 
Male   -.0279 (10.66)  -.0071 (2.31)  -.0177 (8.77) 
Age<25    .1159 (18.66)   .1646 (22.70)   .1229 (19.30) 
Age 25-34    .0330 (8.04)   .0450 (9.58)   .0389 (12.47) 
Age 45-54    .0097 (2.56)   .0046 (1.05)   .0071 (2.46) 
Age 55-64   .0250 (5.28)   .0065 (1.22)   .0157 (4.40) 
Age ≥65  -.0395 (4.26)  -.0741 (6.72)  -.0566 (7.89) 
2009     -.0089 (2.76)   .0345 (13.77) 
2010       .0435 (13.51) 
Austria   -.0553 (8.22)  -.1035 (13.34)  -.0785 (15.24) 
Denmark   -.0325 (3.87)  -.0241 (2.24)  -.0303 (4.45) 
Finland   -.0334 (3.97)   -.0306 (2.88)   -.0327 (4.80) 
France   -.0298 (3.76)  -.0375 (3.76)  -.0336 (5.27) 
Germany  -.0095 (1.24)  -.0190 (2.04)  -.0135 (2.23) 
Greece   -.0341 (4.22)   -.0576 (5.98)  -.0453 (7.17) 
Ireland   -.0484 (6.65)  -.0051 (0.49)  -.0297 (4.68) 
Italy   -.0546 (8.02)  -.0926 (11.16) -.0727  (13.51) 
Luxembourg   -.0605 (6.48)   -.0655 (5.37)  -.0640 (8.35) 
Netherlands   -.0536 (6.98)  -.0620 (6.38)  -.0583 (9.40) 
Portugal   -.0313 (4.16)  -.0388 (4.10)  -.0350 (5.78) 
Spain   -.0056 (0.65)   .0327 (2.94)   .0133 (1.88) 
Sweden   -.0549 (7.34)  -.0573 (5.73)  -.0574 (9.24) 
UK   -.0178 (2.27)  -.0162 (1.65)  -.0168 (2.66) 
Cyprus     -.0647 (7.21)  -.0701 (6.08)  -.0683 (9.35) 
Czech Republic   -.0454 (6.33)  -.0563 (6.21)  -.0509 (8.80) 
Estonia   -.0579 (7.87)   .0045 (0.42)  -.0294 (4.51) 
Hungary    .0186 (1.98)   .0291 (2.54)   .0241 (3.25) 
Latvia    .0014 (0.17)   .0720 (6.20)    .0351 (4.87) 
Lithuania    .0102 (1.15)   .0677 (5.69)   .0376 (5.05) 
Malta   -.0449 (4.16)  -.0572 (4.27)  -.0512 (5.93) 
Poland    .0283 (2.92)   .0016 (0.15)   .0165 (2.23) 
Slovakia   -.0379 (5.22)  -.0393 (4.24)  -.0387 (6.56) 
Slovenia   -.0051 (0.57)  -.0168 (1.59)  -.0109 (1.58) 
Bulgaria    .0209 (2.32)    .0262 (2.39)   .0245 (3.42) 
Romania   -.0180 (2.20)  -.0340 (3.38)  -.0255 (3.92) 
ALS 16-19   -.0496 (13.21)  -.0660 (13.82)  -.0577 (19.08) 
ALS 20+   -.0944 (24.68)  -.1263 (26.39)  -.1100 (36.01) 
No FT education    .0825 (2.94)  -.0045 (0.21)   .0300 (1.80) 
Age<25*2009   .0151 (2.09) 
Age<25*2010   .0298 (3.12) 
N  44,354 44,215 88,569 
Adjusted R
2  .0734 .0781 .0759 
Source: Eurobarometers #69.1 (February-March 2008); #69-2 (March-May 2008); #70.1 (October-November 
2008); #72.1 (August-September-October 2009); #72.2 (September-October 2009); and #73.1 (January-
February 2010).  Notes; sample consists of the labour force (employed+unemployed).  Excluded categories 
Belgium and ALS<age 15.  T-statistics in parentheses.   29
Table 5.  Youth Unemployment and Educational Attainment  
   ISCED 1-2  ISCED 3-4  ISCED 5-6 
   2008Q1 2010Q1 Change 2008Q1 2010Q1 Change 2008Q1 2010Q1 Change
European Union  20.1 27.6 7.5 12.6 18.9 6.3  9.7 15.1 5.4 
Belgium  30.7 39.6 8.9 13.1 23.7 10.6 9.2  11.6 2.4 
Denmark  8.1  15.7  7.6  5.3  11.4  6.1          
Germany  12.8  13.9  1.1  8.8  9.1  0.3          
Ireland  17.7 42.6 24.9  8  25  17  4.4  16.3 11.9 
Greece  19.3 27.6 8.3 25.3 29.9 4.6  26  41.8 15.8 
Spain  25.8  49  23.2 16.7 32.6 15.9 13.2 27.4 14.2 
France  28.4 34.5 6.1 15.2 21.5 6.3  7.9 12.4 4.5 
Italy  23.3 32.2 8.9 19.9 27.3 7.4 24.2 20.4 -3.8 
Netherlands  7.9 11.1  3.2 3.9 6.6 2.7  0  4.5 4.5 
Austria  13.2  12  -1.2  5  8  3          
Poland  22.7 34.4  11.7 19  23.7 4.7 14.1 20.9 6.8 
Portugal  16.2  23.2 7 14.2 21 6.8  24.5  25.3  0.8 
Finland  27.5  34  6.5  12.6  20.4  7.8          
Sweden  35.1  44.8  9.7  13.3 23 9.7 13 19.3  6.3 
United Kingdom  25.3 34.6 9.3 10.2 16.6 6.4  7  11.2 4.2   
Source: Eurostat 
 
Notes: International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) levels are as follows: ISCED 0: pre-primary education; ISCED 1: primary 
education. ISCED 2; lower-secondary education; ISCED 3; upper-secondary education;  ISCED 4: post-secondary non-tertiary level of education; 
ISCED 5: tertiary education: ISCED 6: second stage of tertiary education. Data for Denmark, Spain and Portugal relate to the 2
nd quarter 
of 2010.   30
Table 6 – Percent Change in Employment by Age Group 2008Q1 to 2010Q3 
 
Country\Age  Group  15-24 25-49 50-74 
Ireland -42%  -11%  -2% 
Latvia  -34% -10% -20% 
Spain -32%  -10%  3% 
Slovakia -29%  -2%  8% 
Lithuania -28%  -10%  -4% 
Estonia  -27% -8% -14% 
Portugal -25%  -4%  0% 
Italy -15%  -4%  8% 
Greece -14%  -4%  5% 
Euro area (17 countries)  -10%  -4%  8% 
Bulgaria  -9% -5% -6% 
Cyprus -8%  0%  8% 
European Union  -8%  -3%  7% 
Hungary -8%  -2%  4% 
Czech Republic  -7%  1%  -3% 
Germany -6%  -1%  12% 
United Kingdom  -5%  -1%  3% 
Poland -5%  2%  16% 
Netherlands -4%  -4%  7% 
Norway -3%  0%  4% 
Belgium -1%  -2%  11% 
Slovenia -1%  -4%  11% 
Denmark 1%  -5%  -1% 
France 2%  -2%  8% 
Romania  2% 3% 7% 
Austria 2%  1%  12% 
Iceland 2%  -8%  3% 
Malta 3%  2%  13% 
Croatia 10%  -12%  11% 
Finland 12%  -3%  3% 
Luxembourg  16% 9% 20% 
Sweden 17%  1%  1% 
 
Source: Eurostat  31
Table 7.  Well-being in 2008/2009 at age 50  
                                                         Life satisfaction             Health status          Down & depressed       Job satisfaction 
Male   -.2940 (6.42)  -.2264 (4.56)   .0023 (0.22)   -.2292 (4.86) 
Other Scottish    -.1626 (2.31)  -.0348 (0.46)   .0072 (0.46)   -.1155 (1.39) 
GCSE a-c    -.1704 (2.86)    .1841 (2.86)   .0230 (1.72)   -.1947 (2.77) 
Intermediate 2AS/1 A level    -.7833 (2.85)  -.0377 (0.13)   .1086 (1.59)   -.3439 (1.07) 
≥2 A levels    -.2581 (3.04)   .4003 (4.34)   .0243 (1.22)   -.0485 (0.51) 
Diploma            -.2495 (2.40)   .2292 (2.05)   .0722 (2.87)   -.1413 (1.17) 
Degree, PGCE, etc.    -.1265 (1.77)   .4533 (5.83)   .0176 (1.06)   -.0798 (0.98) 
Higher degree    -.1010 (0.87)   .5772 (4.50)   .0358 (1.24)    .0718 (0.56) 
Months unemployed ≤age 23   -.0089 (2.69)  -.0074 (2.00)   .0017 (2.52)    -.0134 (3.25) 
Malaise score @ age 23    -.1080 (14.34)  -.1252 (15.04)   .0293 (18.47)   -.0414 (4.55) 
Very secure job         1.4708 (18.87) 
Fairly secure job         .8303 (11.35) 
Part-time paid employee    -.2018 (3.34)  -.1252 (1.92)   .0524 (3.70)   
Full-time self-employed    -.0220 (0.34)   .0656 (0.94)   .0048 (0.32)   
Part-time self-employed    -.0150 (0.12)  -.1334 (0.96)   .0693 (2.23)   
Unemployed and seeking work  -.7449 (5.52)  -.8653 (6.00)   .2298 (6.71)   
Full-time education      .6058 (1.19)   .3116 (0.54)  -.0747 (0.64)   
Government scheme    -.3029 (0.25)   -.7341 (0.61)   .2955 (0.84)   
Temporarily sick/disabled     -1.3095 (4.62)   -2.9032 (9.04   .3398 (4.63)   
Permanently sick/disabled     -1.4056 (13.98)  -3.2894 (26.62)   .3951 (14.39) 
Looking after home/family     -.2711 (2.87)  -.6154 (5.92)   .0984 (4.33)   
Wholly retired     -.2427 (1.01)  -.6652 (2.41)   .0295 (0.52)   
Other  LF   -.1058 (0.60)  -.3595 (1.89)   .0469 (1.14)   
Married     .8647 (12.96)    .1474 (2.02)  -.0502 (3.35)   
Civil partner                      .2699 (0.57)   -.2765 (0.50)   .1186 (1.04)   
Separated    -.0630 (0.50)    .1500 (1.09)   .0174 (0.64)   
Divorced     .2387 (3.00)    .0703 (0.81)   .0076 (0.44)   
Widowed     -.5383 (2.99)   -.1741 (0.88)   .1547 (3.52)   
Used to smoke   -.0399 (0.88)   -.1454 (2.95)   .0061 (0.58)     32
Smokes occasionally  -.1468 (1.30)   -.1811 (1.50)   .0178 (0.69)   
Smokes every day  -.2645 (4.66)   -.4707 (7.68)   .0157 (1.24)   
No exercise  -.2172 (3.68)   -.6371 (9.88)    .0525 (3.84)   
4-5 days/week   .1608 (2.18)    .1886 (2.36)  -.0051 (0.30)   
2-3 days/week  -.0186 (0.32)   -.0934 (1.47)   .0132 (0.96)   
Exercises once a week   .0333 (0.51)   -.1629 (2.31)    .0172 (1.12)   
Exercises 2-3 times/month   .1175 (1.26)   -.2754 (2.72)   .0065 (0.30)   
Exercises less often  -.0755 (0.49)   -.4838 (2.92)   .0016 (0.04)   
Birth weight (ozs)   .0028 (2.63)     .0019 (1.66)  -.0001 (0.32)   
Constant/Cut1    7.0740 -3.9970   -3.4968 
Cut2   -2.1815   -1.9132 
Cut3   -.4561   -.8504 
Cut4     1.2212     1.0683 
 
Adjusted/Pseudo R
2  .1383 .0904 .1348.0296 
N  7535    7603 7535 7081 
 
Source: National Child Development Study, 1958-2009 
Notes: excluded categories: no qualifications, full-time paid employee; single; never smoked and exercises every day. All equations 
also include 10 region dummies plus a 2009 dummy. 
Dependent variables 
Column 1.  How satisfied are you with the way your life has turned out so far?  Range 0-10; mean=7.29; SD=1.85 - estimated as OLS 
Column 2. Self-assessment of health 1=poor (5.7); 2=fair (12.7); 3=good (29.2); 4=very good (33.0); 5=excellent (19.4) - estimated as 
an ordered logit. Mean=3.48: SD=.95. 
Column 3. Respondent reports often being miserable and depressed (1,0 dummy) - mean=.19; SD=.39 - estimated as a dprobit 
Column 4. Degree of satisfaction with current job; 1=very dissatisfied (1.7); 2= dissatisfied (5.8); 3=neither(11.2); 4=satisfied (39.8) 
and 5=very satisfied (41.5) mean=4.14; SD=3.48 
 
The coefficients provide estimates of  marginal effects, that is the change in the probability for an infinitesimal change in each 
independent, continuous variable and the discrete change in the probability for dummy variables.   33
Figure 1: Youth Time Dummies 1971-2009  
 
 




1 Countries included - Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom and United States. 
 
2 OLS Regression, N = 860, F(39, 797) = 92.02. Coefficient on adult rate = 1.87, t 
statistic = 45.8. Omitted time dummy = 1970. Omitted country dummy = Australia 
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UK data from the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings supplied by the Office of 
National Statistics. Ratio shown is median earnings of 18 to 21-year-olds divided by 
median earnings of 25 to 49-year-olds. 
 
US data from the Current Population Survey supplied by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
Ratio shown is median earnings of 16-24 year olds divided by median earnings of those 
aged 25 and above.  
 
 